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Operation Market Garden, Field Marshal B.L.M. Montgomery’s grand attempt to end 
the war in 1944, has been ceaselessly analysed 
in an attempt to understand the reasons for its 
failure. Factors such as the distance of the drop 
zones from the objectives in Arnhem, the delay in 
resupply, the presence of strong German forces 
in the area, as well as the slow progress of XXX 
Corps in linking the airborne bridgeheads, are 
some of the main reasons cited for the failure 
of the operation. Another element often raised 
has to do with the failure of communications 
equipment at Arnhem. Peter Harclerode, in 
his book, Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors, puts 
it bluntly: “Much of the blame for 1st Airborne 
Division’s demise has been laid at the door of 
signals failure as well as the unsuitability of the 
radio equipment issued to the division as well 
as its failure to work satisfactorily under the 
conditions in which it was employed.”2 Lewis 
Golden, the adjutant of Divisional Signals during 
the operation argues that this was not the case. 
Signals actually worked better than could be 
expected and that communications failure was 
not a principal reason for defeat at Arnhem.3 
This article attempts a comprehensive survey 
of the role of communications and answers the 
question, “How far were poor communications 
responsible for the failure of Market Garden?” 
In particular, how far did poor communications 
contribute to the failure of 1st Airborne Division 
to consolidate a bridgehead at the Arnhem road 
bridge?
* * * * *
In the Second World War, Operation Market Garden, 17-26 September 1944 was an attempt 
by Second British Army (Lieutenant-General 
Miles Dempsey) to advance over several Dutch 
rivers to establish positions around Nunspeet 
on the Ijsselmeer, with bridgeheads over the 
River Ijssel to the east. Three corps of Second 
Army were to conduct the ground advance, VIII, 
XII and XXX, from bridgeheads on the Meuse-
Escaut Canal. The spearhead of the advance 
fell to XXX Corps (Lieutenant-General Brian 
Horrocks), in the centre between XII Corps on 
its left and VIII Corps on its right. Thirty Corps 
had three divisions under command, the Guards 
Armoured, the 43rd (Wessex) and the 50th 
(Northumbrian). The advance of XXX Corps 
was facilitated by three airborne divisions and 
the First Polish Independent Parachute Brigade 
(Major-General Stanislaw Sosabowski) under 
the I British Airborne Corps (Lieutenant-General 
Frederick Browning); the divisions were the US 
82nd (Major-General James Gavin) and 101st 
Airborne (Major-General Maxwell Taylor) and 
the British 1st Airborne Division (Major-General 
Roy Urquhart). The 101st would land on a 
stretch of the route to the Ijsselmeer between 
Eindhoven and Uden; the 82nd, along with the 
Airborne Corps Advance HQ, between the rivers 
Maas and Waal and the 1st Airborne north of the 
Lower Rhine at Arnhem. The 52nd (Air Portable) 
Division was to be flown in to Deelen airfield, 
north of Arnhem, on D+5. 
The assault plan for 1st Airborne was to land 
1st Airlanding and 1st Parachute Brigades 
(Brigadiers Hicks and Lathbury respectively) 
on the north bank of the Lower Rhine on 17 
September (D-Day), for the former to hold the 
landing zones while the latter advanced on the 
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“I see we shall have to do something about your communications.”
General Eisenhower to Major Brian Urquhart, 1942.1
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Arnhem bridges. On D+1, the 4th Parachute 
Brigade (Brigadier Hackett) and elements of the 
Polish brigade would land, all troops to move to 
an extensive bridgehead both north and south 
of the Lower Rhine, secured by 1st Parachute 
Brigade on D–Day. In fact, only about a single 
battalion had secured the north end of the road 
bridge and attempts by the division to relieve it 
failed. The balance of the Polish brigade was to 
drop onto the south bank of the Lower Rhine 
on D+2. In the event, it was delayed until D+4; 
the Poles dropped around Driel, further west 
and further from the road bridge than had been 
planned. Crossings of the Lower Rhine to relieve 
1st Airborne in Oosterbeek were not successful 
and the remains of the division were evacuated 
across the Rhine on the night of D+8-9, mainly 
in the motorized stormboats of the 23rd Field 
Company, RCE.
The Signals Plan and Infrastructure 
in Market Garden
The Signals plan for Market Garden provided for communications between several 
headquarters:
– Second Army and XXX Corps to British 
Airborne Corps Headquarters (Advance, Main 
and Rear) and the US 10lst Airborne;
– The British Airborne Corps to the three 
airborne divisions;
– Second Army and XXX Corps to the Airborne 
Corps and the three airborne divisions for air 
support;
– From the Airborne Corps and the American 
airborne divisions to the base resupply 
organizations; and
– A network for outside artillery support for the 
airborne divisions.4
 The Signals Plan for the Airborne Corps 
entailed the establishment of communication 
between Corps Advance HQ near Nijmegen and 
Corps Rear in England. Corps Main HQ was to be 
cut out of the communication link until it joined 
Advance by road from Brussels.
 Most of the communications problems of 
Market Garden were due to the shape and size 
of the operation and the great haste in which 
it was planned. At its most basic, the problem 
was that HQ First Allied Airborne Army was not 
an operational command so that signals had to 
be inaugurated by commands that varied from 
operation to operation. In the case of British First 
Airborne Corps, the Signals component had only 
just been established as a static formation; it had 
been designed for a smaller, traditional airborne 
operation, which was cancelled. Corps Signals 
had to be rapidly enlarged and improvised for 
the operation, in order for a signals component 
to go in with the Corps Advance HQ on D–Day, 
17 September. The result was poorly trained 
and inexperienced operators with inadequate 
equipment and insufficient information to 
make contact with other units.5 Some of the 
insufficiency of information was put down to 
the need for signals security. Overall signals 
planning was the responsibility of the Chief 
Signals Officer (CSO) Second Army. There was 
a large proliferation of headquarters in England, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, requiring detailed 
information on frequencies, cyphers, call signs 
and codes. Since the airborne force was mixed, 
US elements were added to Corps Signals, too 
hastily trained to be effective, particularly the air 
support parties. American High Power wireless 
equipment was available; but training in this was 
entirely inadequate and it could not in any case 
be transported in great numbers, since its bulk 
would have involved a change in the air plan, not 
possible in the short time involved. 
 Signals planning was slight. Brigadier R.G. 
Moberly, the head of Corps Signals, attended the 
first planning conference at Second Army HQ in 
Belgium but had no subsequent contact with his 
colleagues at Second Army or its three corps. All 
of these HQs were in the process of reestablishing 
their own communications after the pursuit of 
the Germans and the shift of XXX Corps from 
the Antwerp sector to Bourg Leopold, behind the 
start line for the ground advance. 
 The problems encountered by  1st 
Airborne were deeper than this. British Army 
communications had lagged behind the other two 
services between the wars so that the infantry had 
to use obsolete or sub-standard equipment. The 
problem was compounded when such equipment 
was transferred to the Airborne with special 
conditions and demands of its own. Divisional 
Signals had made repeated requests for new 
and better signals equipment. Several British 
paratroop commanders whose forces had fought 
as ground troops expected the signal equipment 
not to work.
3
Bennett: Airborne Communications
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2007
40
 In addition to Corps Signals, there were a 
number of other communication networks:
Phantom Net (GHQ Signal Liaison Regiment 
Detachments). This network connected Second 
Army with the Airborne Corps and the divisions, 
with limited success. It is a mark of British 
independence from Eisenhower’s Supreme 
Headquarters that a mere divisional HQ, that 
of 1st Airborne, had a Phantom link with the 
War Office in London. The senior British officer 
who supervised the War Office connection was 
Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Heathcoat-Amory, a 
future Chancellor of the Exchequer. On D–Day, 
Airborne Corps made contact with Second Army 
through Corps Signals only by way of XXX Corps. 
On D+l, Airborne Corps established communi-
cation with Second Army through Phantom, 
which remained operating after regular contact 
was established through Corps 
Signals, on D+2.
 Even then, Second Army 
was not happy with the state 
of communications. There had 
been no planning staff from 
First Allied Airborne Army 
attached to Second Army 
prior to the operation, only a 
liaison officer. Owing to signals 
congestion and the number of 
headquarters in England and 
Europe, communication with the 
Airborne remained poor, so that 
the state of paratroop operations 
from hour to hour was not 
known. This was disconcerting, 
but Dempsey, the Second Army 
commander, did not in any case 
have a firm grip on the airborne operations. 
When he met Major-General Roy Urquhart 
of 1st Airborne on D-11, he seemed unaware 
of Urquhart’s battle plan and considered 
the isolation of the two brigades at Arnhem-
Oosterbeek “almost inevitable.”6
 Phantom also had mobile patrols. One 
reached the Poles at Driel on D+6, initially 
without successful transmissions. On D+7–9, 
the patrol made contact with the Phantom 
station in Oosterbeek (Lieutenant Neville Hay) 
and was able to report to the Airborne Corps 
on the evacuation.7 The verdict in one of the 
early histories,8 that “information from the 1st 
Airborne, coming through well and accurately, 
was almost exclusively handled by Phantom” is 
an exaggeration of the correct point that Phantom 
worked better than Corps Signals.
This wireless diagram shows Corps 
signals only, not the various other radio 
networks operating (or not) in Market 
Garden. There was no effective contact 
through Corps Signals between British 
1st Airborne and the British Airborne 
Corps until D+3. The US 101st Airborne 
Division had no radio contact with the 
Airborne Corps and made contact with 
XXX Corps only on the morning of D+2.
Source: Report on Operations “Market” 
and “Garden”, Signal Report, Index A, 
Wireless Diagram, Operation “Market”, 
Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum 
London, PI AV 20/31/6, Archive p.89.
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US Air Support Signals Teams. Prior to D-Day, 
liaison between the Airborne and the British 
Second Tactical Air Force (2nd TAF) on the 
continent had been very poor. The divisions were, 
however, each provided with two air support 
signals teams, flown in by American Waco glider. 
These teams were completely unfamiliar with the 
equipment and as such, untrained. They were 
equipped to order air support from Second Army9 
and were also provided with Very High Frequency 
(VHF) sets to contact the overflying support 
aircraft. There was no direct contact between 
the Airborne Corps and 83 Group, 2nd TAF. The 
system did not work well. For much of the time, 
air demands to Second Army had to be relayed 
through XXX Corps, and no contact between 
the airborne and the air forces was ever made 
through the VHF sets. No.83 Group, getting its 
information from Second Army, then had to sort 
and prioritize air demands after many hours of 
delay, relying on a six-figure map reference or on 
coloured smoke and identification panels, not to 
pinpoint targets but to identify Allied troops. The 
airborne 75 mm pack howitzers had no coloured 
smoke to identify targets, so air support could not 
be directed in this way until red or blue smoke 
arrived with the 52nd Division.10 This division 
was never deployed. The 1st Division was limited 
to target pinpointing by XXX corps artillery when 
that Corps had joined up with the Airborne.11 To 
cap it all, 1st Airborne sets were wrongly tuned, 
then destroyed by artillery fire, along with the 
VHF equipment.12 The system of “contact cars” 
and “Cabranks” of fighter-bombers, which had 
proved so deadly in Normandy, was largely absent 
from Market Garden.
6080 and 6341 Light Warning Units, RAF. 
These mobile radar units, to give warning of 
approaching German night bombers, were 
destined for Corps HQ but in fact went into 
Arnhem on the second lift. All four gliders 
carrying the equipment were lost and a large 
majority of the personnel taken prisoner. No 
commentator has connected the devastating 
German night raid on Eindhoven, D+2-3 with 
the lack of radar warning; the fact is that the raid 
was unopposed.
The Jedburgh Net. The Airborne Corps and 
the divisions were equipped with Jedburgh 
stations on the Dutch Resistance network. The 
1st Airborne’s Jedburgh radio team arrived at the 
Arnhem bridge, minus the US Technical Sergeant 
and the equipment, which had been lost on the 
landing zone. As for the two American divisions, 
most of their information came from Resistance 
runners and through the civilian phone system.
The Dutch Phone System. The corps and 
each of the divisions had Dutch liaison officers 
to facilitate contact with the Resistance. The 
instructions for the operation had made it 
clear that, while the Dutch Resistance had 
been penetrated by the Germans, use was to 
be made of the local Resistance as guides and 
as intelligence sources.13 But 1st Airborne was 
so suspicious of the Dutch that they were very 
slow to use them either as para-militaries or as 
agents, including their greatest asset – the phone 
system.14 The Dutch phone system was efficient 
and modern, extending to the Dutch East Indies.15
 The Dutch were able to utilize three phone 
networks: the national Ryks Telefoon system; the 
Gelderland Provincial Electricity Board (Dutch 
acronym PGEM) private network with its head 
office in Nijmegen; and a clandestine network 
operated by Resistance technicians whereby they 
could call many places in the Netherlands without 
going through an operator. The Resistance thus 
had a comprehensive network which was very 
effective when all three routings were used and 
which could survive disruption at key points. 
One such disruption occurred on D+3, when 
the British blew up the Post Office Exchange 
in Oosterbeek and the Germans reoccupied 
the Arnhem exchanges.16 The Dutch were still 
able to use the PGEM network, in some cases 
in conjunction with Ryks Telefoon, to reach key 
points in the Arnhem area such as Wageningen, 
Bennekom, Ede and Doetinchem. Messages sent 
from inside the Arnhem perimeter received, 
however, little response from the Nijmegen nodal 
point.17 Be that as it may, 1st Airborne made no 
attempt to convey to corps, via the phone system, 
the difficulties over supply, nor the urgency of 
relief. The PGEM link between Nijmegen and 
occupied Arnhem continued until 16 November. 
 Dutch agents inside the 82nd Airborne 
Division’s landing area used the phone system 
early on D+1 to inform the 82nd at 1040 hours18 
that “the Germans are winning over the British 
at Arnhem,” the first indication that 1st Airborne 
was in serious trouble. The 101st also used 
the phone system: a Dutch operator heard an 
American voice trying to contact Valkenswaard, 
5
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when that centre was still in German hands.19 
The VIII Corps liaison officer at the 101st used 
the phone system to contact corps HQ when the 
radio proved to be unreliable.20
Carrier Pigeons. Each of the airborne divisions 
used carrier pigeons for communication, 
particularly 1st Airborne.21 The birds, however, 
displayed a disturbing tendency to go on strike 
once released;22 though one pigeon from the 1st 
Airborne, released on September 25th, did reach 
VIII Corps, presumably uninvited.23 One pigeon 
was released by the 101st on D+1, stating that 
the gliders had landed and giving map references 
of the assembly area.24 The 1st Airborne report 
of 10 January 1945 recorded that the division 
took along 82 pigeons of which 14 returned to 
lofts in the London area with messages, eleven 
without; three returned to Airborne Rear HQ. 
The report concluded that “It is really doubtful 
whether pigeons are worth taking on future 
airborne operations similar to this.”
Land lines, runners and dispatch riders. 
Whenever wireless communications failed or were 
non-existent, more use would have to be made 
of more traditional forms of communication. 
The commander of the British 1st Parachute 
Brigade Signals Section, having experienced 
very poor results on signals exercises, took 
on a greater complement of field telephones 
and cable than usual, anticipating a possible 
failure of radio communications.25 When the 
Oosterbeek perimeter was formed, a network of 
land lines was established; but it did not reach 
all companies and the cables were frequently 
severed by artillery and mortar fire.26
The Artillery Net. Artillery communications 
worked well in Market Garden. On the evening 
of D–Day, about 750 paratroopers under the 
command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost 
of 2nd Parachute Battalion had occupied the 
north end of the Arnhem road bridge but they 
were isolated from the balance of 1st Airborne 
in Oosterbeek. On the morning of D+1, the 
artillery link opened between Divisional HQ Royal 
Artillery and 3rd Airlanding Light Battery HQ at 
the Arnhem road bridge. Not only did Frost get 
artillery support but the link enabled Division to 
open communications with 2nd Battalion for the 
first time since it left the Drop Zone on D-Day. 
Using the powerful 19HP sets, Divisional HQ 
Royal Artillery then contacted the 64th Medium 
Regiment Royal Artillery at about 0930 hours 
on D+4, again resulting in very effective artillery 
support for 1st Airborne but also opening a relay 
to XXX Corps for the first time. However, this 
link was poor at night and had its limitations, 
as will be seen.
Signals in Action
Upon landing on D–Day, Corps Signals with the Advance HQ established contact with 
82nd Airborne and this was soon supplemented 
by a land line, not without casualties. Corps 
contacted the 101st Airborne on the air support 
net, since the latter’s Corps Signals unit had not 
arrived by glider.27 After a brief contact with 1st 
Airborne, communication was essentially lost 
until early on D+3, when both Corps Signals and 
Phantom were in operation. On D+3, the British 
began a system of land lines between XXX Corps, 
which had arrived at Nijmegen in the area of the 
82nd, and the Airborne Corps.
The 101st Signals plan was based on that of 
a previous operation, Linnet I, with additional 
links to XXX Corps and Second Army. A Signals 
Company of 31 men was established at Zon and 
began to lay land lines to the regiments and the 
Artillery HQ. Since the British Corps Signals 
unit did not arrive with the gliders on D+1, the 
signallers made contact with the divisional rear 
base in England, who contacted XXX Corps via 
Second Army, though this tortuous link was 
poor.28 A radio liaison team of four men from 
British (Army) No.1 Commando Brigade also 
dropped on D–Day; the details are not well 
known.29 But on the evening of D+1, General 
Taylor still had not made radio contact with 
XXX Corps, under whose command his division 
would come, once the ground link-up had been 
made. Second Army did not respond to queries 
about XXX Corps on the afternoon of D–Day. 
Distances were too great for the 101st to contact 
XXX Corps artillery. Calls on Phantom with 
Market Garden codes were not recognized and it 
was not until the morning of D+2, using known 
British codes, that the Americans made contact 
with XXX Corps. On D+1, the 101st made direct 
radio contact with the 82nd Airborne and, it is 
said, with 1st Airborne.30 The 506th Parachute 
Infantry Regiment, entering Eindhoven on the 
morning of D+l, made contact at 1130 hours 
with their own liaison group at XXX Corps, then 
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advancing to meet them. This 
was achieved through Orange 
Net, a system using a single 
frequency for all levels which the 
signallers had worked out for the 
Normandy operation. They found 
out that XXX Corps was still five 
miles south of Eindhoven and 
encountering opposition from 
German 88s. General Taylor 
directed that the British be 
advised to put bridging engineers 
at the head of their column to 
repair the Zon bridge. That the 
British did so with commendable 
speed and efficiency was due to 
American foresight and, at last, 
good communications. 
The aim in Market Garden was to bring 
responsibility for the flanks of XXX Corps “under 
a separate command.” To this end, 50th Division 
of XXX Corps was brought under VIII Corps at 
1200 hours on D+1, before the latter corps had 
even secured its bridgehead over the Meuse-
Escaut Canal. The 101st Airborne had a liaison 
officer from VIII Corps. Radio contact between the 
two formations was unreliable, but this was no 
great loss, since VIII Corps was in no position to 
provide practical help and co-ordination on the 
right flank until D+5. The 101st Airborne in fact 
came under the command of XII Corps on D+6, 
the VIII Corps liaison officer remaining with the 
division. Radio contact between the 101st and 
XII Corps seems to have been satisfactory since 
there was one case of successful co-ordination 
of operations in the XII Corps sector on D+2. 
The experience of the 101st is revealing. Where 
the Americans used their own communications 
system and their own personnel, things went 
smoothly. This was also true of the 101st air 
support prior to joining up with XXX Corps. But 
where there was a crossover or interface between 
national systems and personnel, communications 
were usually less than satisfactory, again an 
indication of hasty planning and inadequate 
training. The point that solely national ground-air 
communications systems worked well was made 
in the 21st Army Group report, under whose 
command Second Army and the Airborne Army 
came.31 Air support was summoned directly from 
the US Army Air Forces and not via the Airborne 
Corps or Second Army. That things sometimes 
went wrong was not because of a faulty radio 
communications system. The P-47 Thunderbolts 
This is the first page of the specification 
notes for the No.19 Wireless set made 
by Captain Ivor Green, of REME (Royal 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers). 
The No.19 set was used by the artillery 
net in Market Garden, providing a link 
between 1st Airborne Division and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Frost’s battalion 
at the Arnhem bridge. On D+4, the 
artillery link was established between 
1st Airborne Division and the 64th 
Medium Artillery Regiment. Not only 
was this effective for artillery support 
but the link provided a relay to XXX 
Corps and to Second Army for air 
support to 1st Airborne.
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started to strafe American positions before the 
troops laid out identification panels: the 101st 
had as yet no artillery to identify targets and 
in any case no coloured smoke shells for the 
howitzers.32
The problem with 1st Airborne was that 
Divisional Signals were using No.22 radio sets 
which had a maximum range of six miles when 
Corps HQ was 15 miles distant.33 Reliable 
communication would only be possible when 
1st Airborne HQ moved into Arnhem and thus 
closer to Airborne Corps HQ, after the second 
airborne “lift” on D+1. The No.22 sets were 
mobile on jeeps; they required a hefty charger 
for the accumulators. But the divisional HQ 
never did get to Frost’s positions at the Arnhem 
road bridge. Thus Major-General Urquhart had 
to rely on the Phantom net. His messages were 
not acknowledged and he had no way of knowing 
whether they were received. In fact, the Jedburgh 
station in Ede received the news that Urquhart’s 
Phantom connection with the War Office had been 
cut; this occurred on D+2 or perhaps earlier.34 
His operators were given insufficient information 
to contact XXX Corps, even when they were in 
range. He eventually established contact with 
XXX Corps through the artillery link, using the 
larger No.19HP sets with a voice range of 25 
miles. This link worked well and to good practical 
effect. When 1st Polish Parachute Brigade landed 
at Driel and 130th Brigade of 43rd Division came 
within range, the 1st Airborne established contact 
with both.
Signals in Action:
The Case of 1st Airborne Division
On D-Day, communications with the Airborne Corps had been almost non-existent. Though 
there was some contact between 1st Division and 
Airborne Corps Rear HQ in England35 which has 
been well analysed by Lewis Golden,36 there was 
essentially no contact between Urquhart and 
Browning until a series of situation reports were 
received by Browning’s Airborne Corps HQ, now 
designated Main, at Groesbeek, starting at 0800 
hours on D+3. The link was augmented through 
the artillery net on the following day. Urquhart 
attempted communications with London through 
Phantom and through the BBC journalists’ 
link, but the messages were usually garbled 
or unintelligible, owing to competition with a 
powerful German station, possibly with the help 
of a radio jamming station in Ede.37 This link did 
work occasionally because Brereton, the Allied 
Airborne Army commander, visiting the American 
Airborne in the Eindhoven-Zon area, received 
news of the supply situation of 1st Airborne on 
the morning of D+3, which had reached his HQ 
in England via the BBC link.38 Even Captain 
British 1st Airborne Division planned to use the No.22 
wireless set to communicate with the British Airborne 
Corps. Unfortunately, the six-mile range of the set could 
not reach the 15 miles to Corps Headquarters. Left: A 
No.22 Set in a specially designed container for airborne 
drops. Above: A No.22 Set mounted in an airborne jeep.
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Eric Mackay’s engineers besieged at the Arnhem 
bridge received the BBC public transmissions 
from London, though it was disconcerting to hear 
that they had been relieved!
Within the division, things were worse. 
Communications had broken down completely 
by 2130 hours on D-Day. Brigadier Lathbury 
of the 1st Parachute Brigade did not wait long 
enough for his jeep-borne No.22 rover set to 
open so he took off to the brigade front, then 
advancing on the road bridge, with a No.68P set, 
which had a range of three miles.39 His battalions 
were equipped with such sets, which were one-
man pack sets operating on two frequencies 
with replaceable dry cell batteries. When Major 
Anthony Deane-Drummond, second-in-command 
of Divisional Signals, had expressed concern in 
1943 about the short range of such sets, he was 
assured that the divisional perimeter in airborne 
operations would be no more than three miles 
in diameter.40 Since this was, conveniently, the 
range of the No.68P sets, Deane-Drummond 
thought that the figure was produced simply to 
shut him up.
Within the battalions, the companies and 
platoons used very short range SCR-536 sets. 
The reconnaissance squadron used its own radio 
net; there never was an effective link within the 
Squadron, with Division or 1st Parachute Brigade 
on D-Day.
Two things were essential. The first was a link 
between 1st Parachute Brigade heading for 
the Arnhem bridge and divisional HQ. This 
broke down soon after 1545 hours, when 1st 
Parachute Brigade moved off to Arnhem; it was 
not reestablished on D-Day. The second was a 
link between the brigade and its three battalions. 
Lathbury was separated both from Frost and his 
own Brigade Major on the bridge. The brigadier 
was with 3rd Battalion; he made contact with 
Frost’s 2nd Battalion on the bridge and by 2130 
hours both Lathbury and Urquhart, who was 
with him, learned that 2nd Battalion was on the 
bridge, which was intact.41
It might seem that poor communications were 
responsible for 1st Parachute Brigade’s failure to 
arrive at the Arnhem Bridge in strength. Major-
General David Belchem42 blamed communication 
breakdown for the failure of 1st and 3rd 
Battalions to concentrate for the advance. The 
SCR-536 sets seem also to have been ineffectual, 
since companies made no use of information to 
communicate successful routes to the bridge.43 
Major Tatham-Warter of “A” Company, 2nd 
Battalion, for example, had no confidence in 
such sets and used bugle calls instead – to good 
effect.44 In 156th Battalion of 4th Parachute 
Brigade, which had arrived on D+1, the walkie-
talkies worked intermittently over short distances 
in the daytime and not at all at night.45
Below: The SCR-536 was a short-range walkie-talkie 
that did not work effectively during Market Garden. Right: 
One of the ad hoc signals links used by 1st Airborne to 
communicate with the outside world included sending 
messages to the War Office through the BBC net, which 
used morse keys and the No.76 Set.
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The truth is multi-faceted. First, there would have 
had to have been enough information passed 
to ascertain that Frost’s route, while difficult, 
was still open. It was in fact still open, albeit 
very tenuously, on the morning of D+1 because 
Major Munford made the trip from the bridge 
to divisional HQ and back. Frost contacted 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie of Lathbury’s 1st 
Battalion in the evening of D-Day, telling him 
that he needed reinforcements. Dobie then made 
the correct decision to abandon his assigned 
northern route to the bridgehead and move 
south-east “to help Johnnie at the bridge.”46 
Lathbury with Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch at 3rd 
Battalion HQ was in touch with his brigade major 
at the bridge. Tony Hibbert, the brigade major, 
told Martin Middlebrook in the early 1990s that 
he had informed Lathbury that 2nd Battalion’s 
route had been clear a short time earlier. This, 
together with the news that the road bridge was 
intact, took place at about 2130 hours, just 
before the radio failed.47 But Lathbury declined 
to switch his axis of advance, nor did he follow 
up “C” Company’s route to the bridge, which had 
been reconnoitred and found to be clear as far as 
the reconnaissance went. Instead, 3rd Battalion 
halted until 0430 hours on D+l.48 If 1st Parachute 
Brigade had arrived in strength at the bridge, 1st 
Airborne would still have had to keep the route 
open until after the second lift on D+1, which 
brings us back to an old controversy of whether it 
was a landing too far from the bridge, the absence 
of a second lift, or German opposition that 
caused the failure. Though there were serious 
communication difficulties in 1st Parachute 
Brigade on D-Day, the facts and indications seem 
to bear out Lewis Golden’s contention that signals 
were not to blame for the failure to get to the 
bridge in strength. Similarly with 4th Parachute 
Brigade, where communications with divisional 
HQ, using No.22 and No.68P sets, broke down 
during the Brigade’s retreat back to Oosterbeek 
on D+2: orders were given by Urquhart in person 
or Hackett acted on his own initiative. Any errors 
were not due to the signals failure.49
The Critique of Signals at Arnhem
Lewis Golden, who had been adjutant of divisional signals, produced a definitive 
critique of signals at Arnhem in l984, on which 
much of the preceding rests. Golden made two 
principal contentions, both contrary to previous 
accounts: that signals actually worked better 
than could be expected and that communications 
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failure was not a principal reason for defeat at 
Arnhem.50 As for the contention that signals 
worked better then could be expected: the 
division was using unsuitable equipment, with 
rough handling owing to constant loading 
and unloading; the hazards of dropping and 
landing; the difficulties of tuning sets under 
battle conditions and battle damage itself. The 
iron in the sandy soil at Arnhem, buildings and 
trees impeded both transmission and reception. 
Shortage of the replaceable batteries for the 68P 
sets was also a problem.51
There is one area, however, where Golden seems 
to have overstated his case. Over the dearth of air 
support for 1st Airborne, he advanced the usual 
explanations of bad weather and the prohibition 
of air support during airborne operations and 
supply. But the tone of his remarks, that air 
support was “apparently…not available” and that 
the air force “apparently found themselves able 
to help”52 indicates that he wanted to blame the 
RAF for poor air support. The US Air Support 
Signals Teams’ equipment had been destroyed, 
placing reliance on a “circuitous radio route in 
the absence of a direct air support link.” This, 
Golden claimed, was “clearly” not responsible 
for the withholding of air support until D+6. 
Golden, who had researched the signal logs 
exhaustively, cited only four examples of air 
support requested through the artillery link, one 
from Airborne Corps on D+2; one on D+4 from 
1st Airborne; and two more from the same source 
on D+8. For the first and second, there was no 
response; the third was refused and the fourth 
was honoured. From this, it can hardly inferred 
that it poor air support was the fault of the RAF. 
The second signal is intriguing. The request was 
made at 1700 hours on D+4 for air support at 
1830 hours; if not then, it was not wanted at all. 
Consider the route. The 64th Medium Artillery 
link was already overloaded with messages other 
than those concerning artillery support. The 
message would then have to go to XXX Corps, 
then to Second Army, thence to 83 Group, 2nd 
TAF, then to the airfields, with allowance for take-
off and flying time. It is not reasonable to deny 
that the circuitous radio route was responsible for 
the unavailability of air support 90 minutes after 
the request. Even with ideal communications, the 
turnaround time for air support from request to 
delivery was one hour.53
On the Phantom net, four further requests can be 
identified. The first of these was a general request, 
without map references, on the morning of D+1; 
this was passed to Second Army. The second, on 
the afternoon of D+3, specified four six-figure 
The fighting around the Arnhem bridge was vicious, as witnessed by this oblique air photo which shows the burnt-out 
vehicles of the German SS unit which attempted to cross the bridge.
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map references; Second Army acknowledged 
and promised air support. The third was an 
urgent request, without map references, on the 
morning of D+4 for “maximum air support”; this 
message was possibly identical to the one sent 
at 1700 hours via the artillery link. The fourth, 
with three sets of map references, was late in the 
morning of D+5; this was quickly acknowledged 
by Second Army and turned down on account of 
the weather.54
Golden’s second contention, that communication 
breakdown was not a principal cause of the 
failure at Arnhem, was also correct. The only 
reservation concerns the supply run on D+2, 
when Urquhart was unable to get a message 
through, advising that the drop zone was in 
enemy hands. This has been challenged by John 
Baynes, who quotes the 1st Airborne Divisional 
Signals Report which recorded that links were 
open to the War Office via the BBC net, with 1st 
Airborne Corps using No.76 sets with morse 
keys and with Second Army through Phantom. 
This, however, does not prove the messages were 
received, especially as messages the next day were 
received, and acted upon. The fact that Urquhart 
seems not to have been advised of the two final 
supply runs from Brussels was not because of 
a communications failure. The reason for the 
failure of the supply runs was partly that the 
drop area was so small and partly because the 
Germans had latched on to the British supply 
plan and laid out identification panels at the 
right time and place each day.55 The supply pilots 
were instructed to ignore ground signals other 
than those designated. It is also possible that the 
Germans used captured Rebecca-Eureka radio 
beacons. When the retired Dutch Artillery Colonel 
Boeree interrogated the German commanders 
after the war, both Rauter, the SS Security chief 
for the Netherlands, and one of the officers of 
Helle’s Dutch SS battalion at Arnhem told him 
that a British officer was captured on D-Day with 
the plans for the ground markers and smoke 
signals.56 The Germans also listened in to British 
radio signals on No.68P sets which captured 
paratroopers had not destroyed.
The failure of supply to 1st Airborne was 
not essentially due to the failure of radio 
communica t ions ,  though  the  Br i t i sh 
communication system for supply was still not 
good. Because the American divisions had a 
direct radio link to England, they could quickly 
call upon supplies to be landed in the right 
place and by units immediately available on the 
continent, namely the US 8th Air Force. Urquhart, 
however, had no direct radio link to the supply 
bases in England, a fact that Golden did not 
mention. 
The Improvement in 1st Airborne 
Communications on D+3
Agreat improvement in communications between 1st Airborne Division and the 
outside world started on D+3. This was also 
the day on which the Oosterbeek perimeter was 
formed, which reduced the importance of radio 
communications within the division. An attempt 
to improve 1st Airborne Division’s internal 
Left: A British paratrooper at Arnhem attempts to make 
use of a No.68P set. This set proved largely inadequate 
as it had a range of only three miles and suffered from 
shortage of batteries.
Right: Paratroopers of “C” Section, 1st Airborne Divisional 
Signals, gather on DZ “X” shortly after their drop at 
Oosterbeek on 17 September 1944. The soldier in the 
centre is using the SCR-536 walkie-talkie.
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communications had begun on D-Day. In the 
afternoon, the second- in-command of Divisional 
Signals, Major Anthony Deane-Drummond sent 
out a jeep with a No.22 set to try to establish a 
relay between the moving 1st Parachute Brigade 
HQ and the signals base. Some faint signals faded 
away altogether. At 1730 hours, a despatch rider 
was sent out to notify 1st Parachute Brigade “to 
change over the command net frequency to the 
frequency allotted to the 76 set group, known as 
the B wave, which was to be established between 
the headquarters and the brigades for the 
passage of cypher traffic by morse code.”57 This 
expedition failed, so Deane-Drummond himself 
set out at 0715 hours on D+1; he joined up with 
1st Battalion. In his own account, he made radio 
contact with Major Hibbert at the bridge and told 
him of the frequency change. But since there was 
no contact between Hibbert and the division, he 
elected to move forward to the bridge to supervise 
the radio connections with the divisional HQ. In 
doing so, he had to take command of some 1st 
Battalion troops whose company commander had 
been killed. Deane-Drummond was eventually 
captured after attempting to return to his signals 
base.58 Contact with the bridge on the B wave was 
eventually established at 1000 hours on D+3; 
meanwhile, the artillery link was used. Frost did 
get a message to XXX Corps at about 1000 hours 
on D+2, stating his position and receiving a reply 
that the Nijmegen bridge would be attacked at 
1200 hours, with no time of relief estimated.59 
The assaults on the Nijmegen bridge later that 
day were unsuccessful.
There were several unsatisfactory contacts 
between 1st Airborne and Corps Advance, Main 
and Rear HQ prior to D+3 but none resulted in 
significant information being exchanged. The 
first definite contact between 1st Division and 
Airborne Corps Signals was at 0300 hours on 
D+3, when Urquhart advised Browning’s HQ 
of the change in the Drop Zone for the Polish 
paratroopers south of the Lower Rhine and of 
a new drop zone for the day’s supply run. Both 
messages got through to the airfields in England. 
The Poles’ drop was again cancelled while the 
supply aircraft were directed on a zone 200 yards 
west of Urquhart’s HQ at the Hartenstein Hotel. 
From 0800 hours, Urquhart was able to send 
a series of situation reports to Airborne Corps 
HQ. One message was received by Browning at 
0950 hours, stating that 1st Airborne required 
“immediate relief.” Again, Urquhart signalled at 
1505 hours saying that the situation was serious 
for 1st Parachute Brigade at the bridge, that he 
was forming a perimeter and that “relief essential 
both areas earliest possible.” He also reported 
the ferry crossing held. By the evening, it was 
known by all commands that 1st Parachute 
Brigade was isolated at the bridge and could 
not be resupplied. It was also known that the 
resupply zones for the division were almost 
entirely in enemy hands, that the fighting was 
intense and the position of 1st Airborne was 
not good. At 0900 hours on D+4, Horrocks 
got a message from Urquhart’s HQ via the 64th 
Medium Artillery Regiment that the north end 
of the road bridge was still held, and reiterating 
that the Driel-Heaveadorp ferry was in British 
hands. Neither was in fact correct. The previous 
message on D+3 had said that Driel-Heveadorp 
was a Class 24 ferry capable of carrying six tanks 
per load, a great exaggeration. At 2045 hours on 
D+3, Airborne Corps Rear HQ in England sent a 
message to Exfor Main, Eisenhower’s HQ, stating 
that the British retained control of the ferry.60 
For this reason, Sosabowski’s Polish brigade 
prepared to aim for the ferry crossing rather than 
trying to fight their way along the south bank of 
the river to the road bridge. Sosabowski was in 
fact informed after dawn on D+4, the day the 
drop finally took place, that the ferry was intact. 
The ferry was still in use during daylight on D+3, 
being moored at Heveadorp when not in use.61 
Two patrols that night reported to Urquhart’s 
HQ that the ferry was either disabled or gone.62 
However, the 1st Airborne war diary, records 
the return of one of the patrols at 0340 hours 
on D+4; but not the loss of the ferry.63 The Poles 
on the south bank in the evening of D+4 saw no 
sign of the ferry.
In a Phantom message sent at 0515 hours on 
D+4, Urquhart reported that troops north of the 
ferry had been withdrawn, an understatement 
of what his patrols had reported during the 
night. This message was, however, not logged 
until 1415 hours, the time that the Poles took 
off from their bases in England. In his memoirs, 
Urquhart strongly implies that he knew the ferry 
had been lost before about 1715 hours on D+4, 
the time of the Polish parachute drop.64 Urquhart 
reported the loss of the ferry in two Phantom 
messages, at 0830 hours and at 0931 hours on 
D+5.65 At 1900 hours on D+5, Airborne Corps 
Rear reported the ferry’s loss to Eisenhower’s 
13
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HQ and the British War Office. This news had 
come both from Urquhart and via both the Poles 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, Urquhart’s 
Chief of Staff, on the radio of the troop of the 2nd 
Household Cavalry in Driel.
Within the division, Urquhart got a radio message 
from 4th Parachute Brigade soon after 0730 
hours on D+3, stating that the brigade would 
be unable to reach the divisional HQ and so 
take part in 1st Parachute Brigade’s continuing 
efforts to reach Frost at the road bridge. Both 
brigades had in fact been virtually destroyed the 
day before. So when Major Freddie Gough at the 
road bridge contacted Urquhart on the civilian 
phone line shortly after 0800 hours, he was told 
that he could expect no relief from the division, 
only from XXX Corps coming up from the 
south.66 After that, two-way radio communication 
seems to have broken down. One message from 
the bridge, received in the evening, suggested 
continuing resistance. The result was that both 
Urquhart and Horrocks at XXX Corps could only 
assume that the north end of the bridge was still 
held; Urquhart told Airborne Corps in the evening 
of D+4 that there had been no news from the 
Arnhem bridge for 24 hours.67 
Long after Operation Market 
Garden was over, the evidence 
remained. Those gliders that 
survived the landing and were 
not burned by the Germans lay 
in Dutch fields for months after 
the fighting had ended.
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Conclusions
There has been intense debate as to how far poor communications contributed to failure 
at Arnhem. So far as the relief of 1st Airborne by 
XXX Corps is concerned, there are two issues: 
(1) knowledge by the two units of the situation 
at the north end of the Arnhem road bridge; 
and (2) knowledge on the part of the relieving 
force of the state of the Driel-Heveadorp ferry. 
When the advance of the Guards Armoured up 
the Nijmegen-Arnhem road was stalled on the 
afternoon of D+4, Horrocks ordered a move 
along an alternative route through Oosterhout 
and Valburg to Driel. The purpose of the offensive 
was still to move “in the direction of Arnhem”; the 
state of the ferry was not a consideration. The 
Poles’ parachute drop the same afternoon was in 
the vicinity of Driel. The occasion for this choice 
of drop zones was not the state of the ferry but 
the fact that the original drop zone further east 
was occupied by the Germans. Sosabowski was 
somewhat reassured that his parachute drop 
had sound tactical purpose when he learned in 
the morning that the ferry was intact. However, 
it had in fact been lost the night before. The first 
thought of the first unit of XXX Corps to arrive 
at Driel in force on D+5, the 5th Battalion, The 
Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, was to move 
east to the road bridge, but this was not possible 
due to the strength of the German blocking line. 
Crossings of the Lower Rhine were to be at Driel 
with assault boats and not via the road bridge, 
a fact that was conveyed to Urquhart in Arnhem 
on D+5. So the presumptions conveyed to XXX 
Corps on the condition of 1st Division at the 
road bridge and the state of the Driel-Heveadorp 
ferry had no practical effect on tactical planning. 
The Allied troops in Driel could be employed in 
crossing the Lower Rhine or in reaching the road 
bridge. There never was any attempt to reach the 
road bridge from Driel, nor did the supposed 
holding of the north end of the bridge dampen the 
plan to cross the Lower Rhine at Driel.
 Within the 1st Airborne Division, it has been 
seen how poor communications in 1st Parachute 
Brigade on D-Day cannot be held responsible for 
the failure of 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions to 
reach the 2nd at the Arnhem road bridge. After 
that, inadequate communications within 1st 
Airborne Division certainly had a detrimental 
effect on operations. When Brigadier John 
Hackett arrived with 4th Parachute Brigade on 
D+1, he found Brigadier Hicks of 1st Airlanding 
Brigade commanding the division in the absence 
of Urquhart, who was out of touch with his 
headquarters until the morning of D+2. Hicks 
told Hackett that the battalions of 1st Parachute 
Brigade, still heading for the road bridge were 
“fighting on their own.” This was part of the 
mess that Hackett considered the division to 
be in, but Hicks cannot be blamed for the fact 
that communications with the battalions of 1st 
Parachute Brigade continued to be problematic. 
Hackett’s 10th Parachute Battalion was added 
to those of 1st Parachute Brigade advancing on 
the road bridge. But Hackett, evidently, wanted 
his battalion back. Urquhart, now returned to 
his HQ, sent a radio message to 10th Battalion 
at 0900 hours on D+2, ordering it not to 
advance on the road bridge but to assemble for 
a move north. (Whether this was good tactics, 
need not concern us.) An advance, to form a 
bridgehead with its perimeter well north of the 
Arnhem bridge, had been the original mission 
of 4th Parachute Brigade. This message was 
not received. Sometime before 1100 hours, the 
10th Battalion received a message to advance 
north west in support of its parent 4th Parachute 
Brigade, still a mile to the west. The battalion 
was caught by the Germans while forming up for 
the foray, one company having been shredded 
in 1st Parachute Brigade’s advance, in which 
it was not supposed to take part. The 10th 
Battalion, in Urquhart’s words, “disintegrated.” 
It was arguably poor communications that were 
responsible for the loss of the bulk of 10th 
Battalion. At the same time, one company of the 
7th Battalion, King’s Own Scottish Borderers 
was captured when, evidently out of radio 
contact, it retreated in the wrong direction and 
was forced to surrender.
 Apart from this, it has been contended, faulty 
radio communications were not responsible for 
the virtual loss of 4th Parachute Brigade. Poor 
communications caused heavy and avoidable 
casualties in 1st Parachute Brigade since the 
battalions and companies were unable to co-
ordinate their advances, sometimes running into 
the same opposition which had frustrated an 
earlier unit advance. Yet this was not the cause 
of failure. By the time the German opposition 
had solidified on D+1, with mortars, light flak 
and armoured vehicles, there was really no 
chance of relieving Frost at the bridge, even with 
communications at their best.
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